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Abstract  
 
The standard analysis of indefinites (e.g. Russell or more recently in the Discourse Representation Theory) views them as introducing 
a new discourse referent that is considered as independent from both the textual and extra-textual context. Still it can be observed that 
in many situations such as dialogue there are cases where sequences of indefinites are explicitly referring to the same entity, when for 
instance its properties have to be refined. On the basis of a corpus study of task-oriented dialogue transcriptions, we show that 
indefinites can only be coreferential if the events that bear them as arguments are coreferential as well. We thus identify the basic cues 
that may lead to the automatic determination of such situations (e.g. adverbials, sub-categorising statements etc.) and apply them to 
analyze our corpus examples. We also show that the configuration of dialogue acts (re-statements, question-answer pairs) directly 
influence the subsequent use of indefinite following an initial statement. 
 
 
 
1. 
                                                     
Standard Analysis of Indefinites 
The standard analysis of indefinite noun phrases is 
based on Russell, viewing them as introducing a 
quantifier. In traditional first order logic, existential and 
universal quantification states a relation between the 
denotations of two predicates, and is opposed to 
designation which consists in naming individuals by 
constants. For a sentence like (1), the standard translation 
for a is the following : 
 
(1) A man is walking : ∃x man(x) ∧ walking(x) 
 
The advantage of this analysis is to isolate noun 
phrases which do not refer to a particular individual, and 
to give a rather good approximation for linguistic 
observations like those well known as "quantifier scope 
ambiguities". But an important limitation of this view is 
that it is unable to give a correct account of phenomena 
like cross-sentential anaphora and "donkey sentences" 
(Kamp, 1981). 
This limitation was one of the criteria1 for considering 
that indefinites in a restricted sense – a N, Ns, two Ns – are 
not to be treated as quantifiers like at least one N, every N, 
exactly two Ns. It leads to a separate treatment of 
quantified NPs and indefinites in the DRT framework 
(Kamp and Reyle, 1993). Whereras quantified NPs 
introduce a tripartite structure, where the quantifier 
expresses a particular relation between a restrictor and a 
scope, indefinite NPs introduce just a new variable for an 
individual. In the following, we concentrate on such 
indefinites. 
The fact that indefinites introduce a new variable is 
intended to reflect the idea that they are used to introduce 
new discourse referents, whereas definite descriptions, 
demonstratives and pronouns  are used to refer to already 
known entities. Such a correlation between linguistic 
1 Other criteria and a more detailed overview can be 
found in Corblin (1994). 
forms and assumed familiarity or cognitive status has been 
proposed in particular by Prince's Taxonomy (1981) and 
refined by the Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel et al.,1993). 
For both, the use of indefinite descriptions is optimally 
associated to "brand new" entities (Prince, 1981), for 
which the hearer can only access a representation of the 
type described by N (Gundel et al., 1993). But following 
Gundel et al., a cognitive status of the Givenness 
Hierarchy entails all lower statuses, and a particular form 
can be often replaced by forms which require a lower 
status. Since the status "type-identifiable" is entailed by all 
other statuses, all other statuses meet necessary conditions 
for use of the indefinite article. Nevertheless, as shown in 
data from different languages, it is not the case. Therefore, 
Gundel et al (1993) invoke supplementary conversational 
implicatures, stating that the use of an indefinite noun 
phrase implicates that the referent is not uniquely 
identifiable, and hence not familiar. 
Related to this cognitive aspect of the use of 
indefinites – non familiarity – is a linguistic one, which is 
context independance. From a linguistic point of view, 
Corblin (1987) opposes the category of indefinites to the 
categories of definites and demonstratives on the basis of  
their relations to the context. He considers the category of 
indefinites as a typically context independent category, 
taking this feature as a consequence of the basic 
referential operations associated with the interpretation of 
indefinites : enumeration and extraction. This means, that 
a sentence of the type "n N X" (Two dogs bark) an always 
be interpreted as an extraction of n individual values from 
the the class of N, based on information given by X. It 
follows from this principle that each possible extraction is 
strictly independent from all the others, since the 
conditions for an extraction are fully defined by a given 
class N, a number n and predicative information X. This 
view on the functioning of indefinites excludes any 
connection to the context or to previous extractions. 
The condition of non familiarity and the interpretation 
principle of context independance justify the standard 
view on indefinites, which is a non coreferential one. 
 Indeed, coreference – defined as referentiel identity for 
two or more linguistic forms (Milner, 1982) – links 
usually a first expression introducing a new referent to 
subsequent mentions of this referent (see example 2) :  
(4a)  A et tu prends une deuxième barre 
   take a second line 
(4b)  A une petite  
   a small one  
(2)  A man is walking. The man is followed by a dog.  
(5a)  A et tu vas prendre une ligne verticale  
   and you have to take a vertical line Since the referent has already been isolated via the 
first mention making it uniquely identifiable, the 
conditions of non familiarity and context independance do 
not hold for subsequent mentions. Therefore, the use of a 
second indefinite intended to refer to the same referent is 
not suitable (see example 3) :  
(5b)  B une grande ? 
   a big one ? 
(5c)  A une grande oui  
   a big one, yes  
 
 (6a)  A donc au bord de cette route, il y a deux  
(3)  A man is walking. A man is followed by a dog.    maisons 
   so beside this road, there are two houses  
(6b)  A donc une maison qui se trouve à gauche  Not only does this not correspond to the cognitive 
status of the referent, but it would also suggest a context 
independent interpretation : In (3), the second indefinite 
simply operates a second extraction of an individual from 
the class MEN,  but since nothing forces nor prevents the 
identity of the two mentioned individuals, the discourse is 
somehow odd.  
   de cette route et une autre à droite 
one house on the left of this road and 
another one on the right 
 
(7a)  A et tu vas prendre un rond  
   and you have to take a circle 
The standard analysis of indefinites – seeing them as 
introducing new discourse referents which are non 
familiar and context independant – seems to fit well in the 
general picture. Still, it does not account entirely for the 
data we observed. 
(7b)  B un grand ou un petit ? 
   a big one or a small one ? 
(7c)  A  un petit 
   a small one 
 
(8a)  A alors, il va falloir que tu fasses un toit 
2. 
                                                     
The Data    now you have to make a roof 
(8b)  A il faut que tu mettes un grand triangle Our data stems from a french corpus of task oriented 
dialogues2, involving two persons, A and B, in a task of 
figure manipulation. Following the instructions given by a 
A, B has to reconstruct simple pictures(Figure 1a). The 
pictures are composed of geometrical figures, available 
from a virtually illimited stack of objects of various 
shapes (Figure 1b).  
   you have to put a big triangle 
 
 
In (4), (5) and (7), there are respectively two, three and 
four indefinites specifying the same referent, i.e. the figure 
to be manipulated. In (6b), the two indefinite noun phrases 
une maison qui se trouve à gauche de cette route and une 
autre à droite do not introduce new referents, but rather 
refer to the same entities as deux maisons in (6a). Finally, 
in (8), un toit and un grand triangle stand for the same 
object, even if they project probably different points of 
view on this entity. 
 
In each of these cases, introducing two different 
discourse referents for the indefinite noun phrases cannot 
be the correct reading, since the indefinite descriptions are 
clearly understood as referring to the same object. What 
we need therefore is first a mechanism which blocks the 
introduction of new referents for indefinites under certain 
conditions, and second, a clearer idea about what can be 
the very nature of these conditions. 
 
Figure 1a. Example of a picture to construct 
 
3. 
3.1. 
Cues for Coreferential Indefinites  
"Condition of newness" as a default 
A proposition concerning the first point – blocking the 
introduction of new discourse referents for indefinites 
under special conditions – has been elaborated by Corblin 
(1994). He proposes to consider the "condition of 
newness" underlying the analysis of indefinites within the 
DRT framework as a default condition. From a logical 
point of view, he first shows that the introduction of two 
different discourse referents for two indefinite 
descriptions does not have any consequences on the model 
 
Figure 1b. Available geometrical figures 
 
Analysing the dialogues, we found several cases where 
sequences of indefinites are explicitly referring to the 
same entity : 
2 The corpus has been collected by N.Ozkan (1994). 
theoretic interpretation of a DRS. Indeed, defining 
embedding as a function from the universe of the DRS 
into the universe of the model does not exclude the 
possibility of mapping two different discourse referents 
onto the same individual in the model, since this relation 
is not an injective one. This means that the standard 
version of DRT (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) does not predict 
any difference between a coreferential and a non 
coreferential use of indefinites. 
In order to strengthen the intuition that it is much more 
natural to use two indefinites for two different individuals, 
but without excluding definitly a coreferential use, 
Corblin proposes to extend the standard version of the 
theory regarding to two points : First, the embedding 
function is redefined as an injective function. Second, the 
rule for indefinites is redefined as a defeasible rule, stating 
that an indefinite is interpreted as introducing a new 
discourse referent, as long as there are no explicit 
indications against this. 
The problem is now to give a more detailed, and 
ideally formalized description of the conditions under 
which this rule has to be overwritten. Corblin (1987, 1994, 
1995) mentions only some informal cues, like 
enumeration of properties (9), previous announcements 
(10) and identity statements (11).  
 
(9) Tu as trompé Marie. Tu as déçu une femme qui 
t'adorait. 
 
(10) Here is a story about Mary. One day, a woman 
crossed the road… 
 
(11) Pierre was looking for Mary. A woman crossed 
the road. It was Mary. 
 
The last type of examples seems to play a central role 
in suspending the default interpretation of indefinites by 
stipulating explicitly – through the use of the verb to be –
the identity of the mentioned entities. It can be related to 
another – may be the best known – case of coreference 
between indefinites, which is an attributive use3, like in 
(12).  
 
(12) My teacher is a woman. 
 
In these cases, the indefinite is not used in order to 
isolate, via the specific reference calculus for indefinites, a 
referent, but rather to define a property of a referent 
identified independently, based on discourse features. 
Discourse features, and more specifically rhetorical 
structure (Mann and Thompson, 1986) or discourse 
relations (Asher, 1993) can also be seen as indicators to 
take into account the interpretation of (9) and (10). This 
brings us to the next section, which relates recent work 
bringing together a particular kind of discourse structure 
and coreference between indefinites. 
3.2. 
                                                     
Event Coreference and Indefinites 
In a recent paper on event coreference and discourse 
relations within the framework of SDRT (Asher, 1993), 
Gaiffe and Danlos (2000) give evidence for the need of a 
                                                     
3 We do not use "attributive" in the sense of Donnellan 
(1966). 
new discourse relation Particularisation. The arguments 
are based on the observation of discourses like (13) and 
(14) : 
 
(13) Ted damaged a garment. He stained a shirt. 
 
(14) Guy experienced a lovely evening last night.  
  He had a fantastic meal. 
 
(14) is a classical example of Elaboration, since the 
event introduced in the second sentence (S2) is a part of 
the event introduces in the first sentence (S1). Example 
(13), however, cannot be analysed like this. Indeed, the 
event introduced in S2 is not a part of the event introduced 
in S1 : the events are the same. In other words, (13) is a 
particular case of event coreference, where the second 
sentence contains more specific information about the 
event than the first one (Danlos, 1999). For this kind of 
discourse configuration, a new discourse relation 
Particularisation has been proposed. The introduction of 
this new relation is justified in particular by the fact that 
event coreference implies necessarily a coreferential 
relation between the arguments of the same thematic role. 
This is for example the case for the indefinites a garment 
and a shirt in (13). 
Therefore, the discourse relation Particularisation can 
be useful regarding our goal – establishing formal criteria 
overwriting the default rule for the introduction of a new 
referent for an indefinite. Indeed, since  
 
Particularisation → event coreference → argument 
identity, 
 
Particularisation can be seen as one of the criteria we 
are looking for. Applied to (13), it means, that the 
Particularisation relation between the first and the second 
event cancels the introduction of a new discourse referent 
for the indefinite a shirt by setting it identical to another 
one. 
The problem we have to solve then is to establish a 
Particularisation relation between two discourse segments 
π1 and π2, corresponding to S1 and S2. Following Danlos 
and Gaiffe (2000), this can be done based on a set of 
linguistic constraints Cpart. If π1 and π2 have to be related 
by a discourse relation τ, and S1 and S2 met the 
constraints Cpart, then the Particularisation relation is 
inferred by default (>) : 
 
(τ, π1, π2) ∧ Cpart  > Particularisation (π1, π2) 
 
The elements of Cpart are the following : 
(a) Cue phrases : S1 and S2 are not related by a cue 
phrase, excepted such cue phrases as more 
precisely or in fact. 
(b) Semantic relations between the constituents of S1 
and S2 :  In order to concentrate on what will be 
useful in the following, we limit ourselves to cases 
where the predicates of S1 and S2 are identical4. 
In this case, the conditions for a particularizing 
event coreference between S1 and S2 are given 
below (Argnr stands for an argument of the 
4 The full list of  conditions can be found in Danlos 
(1999). 
predicate of sentence n, with the thematic role r, 
with n ∋ {1,2,..} and r ∋ {agent, patient,…}) : 
 
particularizing_event_coreference (S1,S2) if 
Predicate1=Predicate2 ∧  
for each Arg2r : 
 Arg2r  = SPEC (Arg1r) ∨ 
 Arg2r = IDENT(Arg1r) and some other 
   element in S2 brings new 
   information 
     
SPEC stands for a relation of semantic specification  
and includes hyponomy (a garment vs. a shirt) and 
identification (a tree vs. a tree near the house). IDENT 
stands for a semantic relation of identity and includes 
pronominal anaphora (a tree vs. it) and semantic identity 
(same expression, synonymy,…).  Roughly speaking, 
these conditions state that, if the predicates of two 
sentences are identical, either the arguments in S2 have to 
give more information than the arguments in S1, or, if the 
the arguments do not give new information, another 
element in S2 (for example, a temporal adverbial like 
yesterday) has to do it.  
3.3. Bringing them together… 
Our main goal is to account for coreferential 
indefinites, such as presented in section 2. Therefore, we 
were looking for a mechanism integrating coreferential 
indefinites into a DRT-like semantic framework, and for 
linguistic cues triggering this mechanism. A suitable 
mechanism has been proposed by Corblin (1994) – see 
section 3.1. Danlos and Gaiffe (2000) consider the 
Particularisation relation within an SDRT-like framework 
as a cue for coreference between indefinites – see section 
3.2 
The main steps for dealing with indefinites can thus be 
defined as follows : If an indefinite occurs in a sentence Si 
giving raise to an S-DRS πi, then  
− the indefinite introduces a new discourse referent 
x into πi 
− if πi has to be linked to a previous S-DRS πi-1 by a 
relation τ and the conditions for a particularizing 
discourse Cpart are met, then a Particularisation 
relation is inferred by default : 
(τ,πi-1, πi) ∧ Cpart  > Particularisation (πi-1,πi) 
− Particularisation(πi-1,πi) implies event 
coreference between S1 and S2, and event 
coreference implies the identity of the arguments 
− therefore, x has to be marked as identical with 
another discourse referent of πi-1 
Applying this to the toy example (15) yields to : 
 
(15) Ted damaged a garment. He damaged a shirt. 
 
S1 : Ted damaged a garment.  
π1  ∃g∃e  garment(g) ∧ damaged(e,Ted,g)  
 
S2 : He damaged a shirt. 
π2  ∃s∃e'  shirt(s) ∧ damaged(e,h,s) ∧ h = ? 
 
(τ,π1, π2) ∧ Cpart , since : 
  
(a) no cue phrases linking S1 to S2 
 
(b) semantic relations : 
 
  
Ted Arg1agent 
damaged Pred1 
a garment. Arg1patient 
He Arg2agent = IDENT (Arg1agent) 
damaged Pred2 = Pred1 
a shirt. Arg2agent = SPEC (Arg1agent) 
 
 
(τ,π1, π2)  ∧ Cpart  > Particularisation (π1,π2) 
 
Particularisation(π1,π2) → event coreference → 
argument identity 
 
π2  ∃s∃e' shirt(s) ∧ damaged(e,h,s) ∧ e'=e ∧ s=g ∧ 
h = Ted 
 
Following this reasoning, the coreferential relation 
between the indefinites a garment and a shirt is 
established, based on the Particularisation relation 
between the two sentences of (15). 
 
4. 
4.1. 
Application to the data 
In this section, we try to apply the machinery 
presented in 3.3. to our corpus examples. Since the 
criterion of Particularisation has been introduced for 
examples taken from written discourse, we have to adapt 
it in several ways to oral dialogues. Nevertheless, we try 
to keep the same backbone of the reasoning, based on a 
comparison of the predicates and arguments in order to 
obtain a coreferential reading for the indefinites occuring 
in our corpus examples  
Example type A  
 
(4a)  A et tu prends une deuxième barre 
   take a second line 
(4b)  A une petite  
   a small one 
 
This example contains two indefinites, une deuxième 
barre and une petite, specifying the same object. 
Therefore, the discourse referent introduced for une petite 
has to be merged with the referent for une deuxième barre. 
One possibility to justify this is to establish a 
Particularisation relation between the discourse segments 
for (4a) and (4b). Nevertheless, the problem is more 
complicated than for the toy examples : The first 
difference concerns the illocutionary force of the 
discourse segments. Up to now, Particularisation has 
been used for statements, whereas (4a) and (4b) are 
orders. The second difference concerns the syntactical 
completeness of the utterances. Since we are interested in 
the modelling of spoken discourse, we have to deal with 
additional phenomena such as VP- and noun head ellipses, 
like in (4b). 
Our representation of the speech acts and propositional 
contents follows Grisvard and Gaiffe (1999). An utterance 
is represented as 
 
IF ( S, H, PC) 
 
with IF = Illocutionary Force  {tell_to, say_that, 
ask_if, ask_wh-}, S = Speaker, H = Hearer and PC = 
Propositional Content. The propositional content is 
equivalent to an S-DRS. Representing the first utterance 
of (4) in this form leads to : 
 
tell_to(A, B, π1) 
 
with  
 
π1  : ∃l∃e second(l) ∧ line(l) ∧ take(e, B, l) ∧  
 e > now 
 
Introducing a representation for (4b) gives raise to : 
 
tell_to(A, B, π2) 
 
with  
 
π2  :  ∃s∃e' small(s) ∧ EVENT(e', B) ∧ e' > now 
 
Indeed, at a first time, all we know about the 
propositional content from the ellipsis is the introduction 
of a small entity. However, (4b) being an order, the 
eventuality under its scope must be a future event which 
the hearer as an agent (Grisvard and Gaiffe, 1999). From 
the dialogue context, and taking into account discourse 
coherence constraints such as Common Theme 
Maximization (Asher et al., 1997), we infer 
supplementary information about π2 : the category of e' 
and of s, and the fact that s has to be an argument of the 
event. Intergrating this information into π2 leads to : 
 
 π2  : ∃s∃e' small(s) ∧ EVENT(e', B) ∧ e' > now 
 ∧ category(EVENT) = take ∧ category(s) = line 
 
The next step is linking π1 and π2 by a discourse 
relation. Therefore, the conditions Cpart for a 
particularizing discourse have to be tested. There is no 
discourse cue between (4a) and (4b), and the semantic 
relations are the following : 
 
Tu (=B) Arg1agent 
prends Pred1 
deuxième barre. Arg1patient 
Tu (=B) Arg2agent = IDENT(Arg1agent) 
prends Pred2 = Pred1 
une petite barre. Arg2agent = SPEC (Arg1agent) 
 
The agent is the same in (4a) and (4b). The 
category of the predicates are compatible. The patients of 
(4a) and (4b) are compatible too : they are of the same 
category, as required in Gaiffe and Danlos (2000). Since 
nothing has been detailed concerning the modifiers, we 
consider here that it is sufficient to have modifiers which 
are not mutually exclusive5. Since small do not exclude 
                                                     
4.2. 
5 In further work, this hypothesis needs to be refined in 
order to take into account more fine-grained linguistic 
observations : Corblin (1987), for example, points out that 
the use of different types of modifiers can be seen as an 
indicator for a non coreferential interpretation, even for 
second, Cpart holds and we can infer Particularisation 
(π1,π2). From that follows that the events in  π1 and π2 are 
the same and therefore, s in π2 has to be identical with l in 
π1 : 
 
π2  : ∃s∃e' small(s) ∧ EVENT(e', B) ∧ e' > now 
∧ category(EVENT) = take ∧ category(s) = 
line ∧ e = e' ∧ s = l  
 
In comparison to previous examples, the 
Particularisation relation holds here between the 
propositional content of two orders, and not between two 
statements. 
Example type B 
 
(5a)  A et tu vas prendre une ligne verticale 
   and you have to take a vertical line 
(5b)  B une grande ? 
   a big one ? 
(5c)  A une grande oui  
   a big one, yes  
 
The dialogue in example (5) contains three indefinites 
specifying a same referent : une ligne verticale (5a), une 
grande (5b) and une grande (5c).  Here, the problem is a 
little bit more complex than in (4) : Not only have we to 
insert a discourse relation justifying the identity between 
indefinites, but we have also to deal with typically 
dialogical aspects, such as questions and answers. 
The first step is the introduction of a representation for 
(5a) : 
 
tell_to(A, B, π1) 
 
with : 
 
π1  ∃l∃e line(l) ∧ vertical(l) ∧ take(e,B,l) ∧  
e > now 
 
Treating (5b) consists then in resolving the ellipsis, 
like in (4). Additionally, (5b) is a question, and we 
consider it as a form of yes-no question (which can be 
paraphrased as Should I take a big vertical line ?). 
Therefore, it introduces a proposition for which the truth 
has to be validated in the continuation of the dialogue  : 
 
ask_if(B, A, π2) 
 
with : 
 
π2  ∃b∃e' line(b) ∧ vertical(b) ∧ big(b) ∧ 
take (e',B,b) ∧ e' > now 
 
                                                                                       
definite descriptions, such as in : Cette rose rouge me 
gêne. Je vais jeter la rose fânée. We think, however, that 
this assumption is a little bit too strong. It is also possible 
that the conditions in dialogues with an immediatly 
accessible perceptual environment are not exactly the 
same as in discourse, where the objects can be identified 
only based on discursive information.  
− ellipse comme en (4) … ? pas très clair… π2 can be attached to π1 by a discourse relation 
NotEnoughInformation (Asher, 1998). (5c) has an 
illocutionary force of say_that. 
− relation QAP entre CP ou entre AdL ? 
 
 
4.3. Example type C say_that(A, B, π3) 
  
 (6a)  A donc au bord de cette route, il y a deux  
 π3, introduced for the propositional content of (5c), is 
a response to (5b). Therefore, the relation between π2 and 
π3 is QuestionAnswerPair (Asher and Lascarides, 1998).  
   maisons 
   so beside this road, there are two houses 
(6b)  A donc une maison qui se trouve à gauche  
Since the ask_if act can be merged with the say_that 
act into a global say_that act, where π3 confirms the truth 
of π2, it yields to a new representation with a new S-DRS 
π2'. 
   de cette route et une autre à droite 
one house on the left of this road and 
another one on the right 
 
 In example (6), deux maisons introduces a new 
complex discourse referent with a cardinality constraint. 
The indefinites une maison qui se trouve à gauche and 
une autre à droite introduce new discourse referents too, 
but the new referents have to be related to the complex 
one, since they refer to parts of it. 
say_that(A, B, π2' ) 
 
π2'  ∃b∃e' line(b) ∧ vertical(b) ∧ big(b) ∧ 
take(e',B,b) ∧ e' > now 
 
This new DRS may be attached to π1.  The conditions 
Cpart holds : there are no discourse cues linking the 
utterances, and the semantic relations are the following : 
(6a) leads to a first representation of the speech act as : 
 
say_that(A, B, π1 )    
Tu Arg1agent 
vas prendre Pred1 
une ligne verticale. Arg1patient 
Tu Arg2agent = IDENT (Arg1agent) 
va prendre Pred2 = Pred1 
une grande ligne 
verticale. 
Arg2agent = SPEC (Arg1agent) 
with : 
 
π1  ∃h∃r∃s house(h) ∧ card(h) = 2 ∧ road(r) ∧ 
state(s) ∧ beside(s, h, r) 
 
(6b) can be interpreted as : 
 
 say_that(A, B, π2 ) The agent and the predicate are the same in (5a) and 
(5b). The patient in (5b) is more specific, since grande 
ligne verticale implies ligne verticale. Therefore, Cpart 
holds, and we can infer Particularisation (π1,π2'). The 
final discourse structure of (5) is given in Figure 2.  
 
with : 
 
π2 ∃y∃z∃r'∃s'∃s'' house (y) ∧ house(z) ∧ state(s') ∧ 
state(s'') ∧ road(r') ∧ on_the_left_of(s',y, r') ∧ 
on_the_right_of(s'',z , r') ∧ r' = ? 
 
 
 
PARTNEI
π1 
π2 π2' QAP
NEI = Not Enough Information 
QAP = Question Answer Pair 
PART = Particularisation 
 
At this stage, nothing says that y and z are part of m. 
Postulating Particularisation(π1,π2) would lead to this 
result. However, as defined in Gaiffe and Danlos (1999), 
this relation holds between events and not between states. 
Therefore, we have to adapt it to coreference between 
states. Let us say that the conditions on discourse cues 
remain inchanged, and the conditions on the semantic 
relations concern the arguments and the predicate of the 
state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relation could be justified since there are no 
discourse cues, and with regard to the following 
reasoning : 
 
Figure 2. Discourse Structure for (5) 
 
 From Particularisation (π1,π2') follows, that the events 
in  π1 and π2' are the same and so do the particpants : on_the_left_of(s, x, y) > beside(s, x, y)  
  
on_the_right_of(s, x, y) > beside(s, x, y)  π2'  ∃b∃e' line(b) ∧ vertical(b) ∧ big(b) ∧ 
 take(e',B,b) ∧ e' > now ∧ e' = e ∧  b = l ∧ e > now 
meaning that the states being on the left and being on 
the right are more specific than the state being beside and, 
therefore, include it. The identity of the argument y, road, 
is guaranted, since it is used deictically in (6a) and (6b). 
The agents of state s, s' and s'' are semantically 
compatible. Now, what happens here is a 
Particularisation relation holding between, on the one 
 
In this example, the Particularisation relation has been 
extended in a manner to hold between the propositional 
content of an order (tell_to) and a statement (say_that). 
 
problèmes : 
 
hand, the sum of the states s' and s'' (π2), and, and the 
other hand, the state s (π1). Therefore, the sum of the 
agents of s' and s'' has to be identical to the agent of s. 
From this, it follows that the two indefinites in (6b) 
introduce referents which are parts of the referent 
introduced in (6a). 
It is worth to mention that the Particularisation 
relation holds indeed between s and the sum – and not 
only one part – of s' and s''. In fact, a discourse composed 
only of s and s' would be awkward : 
 
(16)  There are two houses beside the road. One house 
stands on the left of this road. 
 
An explanation for this is the fact that 
Particularisation cannot hold between the two sentences, 
since the cardinalities of the arguments are incompatible. 
But this example seems also to indicate that the 
Elaboration relation needs to be redefined more 
precisely : In fact, such as defined in Asher and Lascarides 
(1993), nothing prevents from the establishment of such a 
relation between the states in (16). That means that the 
awkwardness of this example cannot be predicted with the 
current state of the definition of this discourse relation. 
4.4. Example type D 
 
(7a)  A et tu vas prendre un rond  
   and you have to take a circle 
(7b)  B un grand ou un petit ? 
   a big one or a small one ? 
(7c)  A  un petit 
   a small one 
 
This example differs from (5) in one point : the 
question in (7b) is not a yes-no-question, but a wh-
question about the kind of object to be manipulated. The 
specification of this object is realized through the use of 
four indefinites. Establishing a Particularisation relation 
between (7a) and a complex segment composed of (7b) 
and (7c) would be one possibility to treat these indefinites 
adequatly. 
As in (5), the first utterance is an order of the form : 
 
tell_to(A, B, π1) 
 
with : 
 
π1  ∃c∃t circle(c) ∧  take(t,B,c) ∧ t > now 
 
(7b), as a wh-question, is a propositional function 
(paraphrased as Which circle should I take ?), taking a 
NP as an argument : 
 
ask_wh(B, A, π2) 
 
with  
 
π2  λNP.[NP][TAKE] 
 
[TAKE] = λx. ∃e take(e, B, x) ∧ circle(x) ∧ (big(x) ∨ 
small(x)) ∧ e > now 
 
 
π2  λNP. [NP] [λx. ∃e take(e, B, x) ∧ circle(x) ∧ 
(big(x) ∨ small(x)) ∧ e > now] 
 
(7c) is a response to (7b), providing the NP which has 
to be applied to π2.  
 
say_that(A,B, π3) 
 
with  
 
π3  λP. ∃s small(s) ∧P(s) 
 
Applying this to π2  yields to : 
π2''  λP. ∃s small(s) ∧P(s) [λx. ∃e take(e, B, x) ∧ 
circle(x) ∧ (big(x) ∨ small(x) ∧ e > now] 
 
π2''   ∃s small(s) ∧ ∃e take(e, B, s) ∧ circle(s) ∧ (big(s) 
∨ small(s) ∧ e > now 
 
π2''   ∃s∃e small(s) ∧ take(e, B, s) ∧ circle(s) ∧ e > now 
 
This new DRS may be attached to π1.  The conditions 
Cpart holds : there are no discourse cues linking the 
utterances, and the semantic relations are the following : 
  
Tu Arg1agent 
vas prendre Pred1 
un cercle. Arg1patient 
Tu Arg2agent = IDENT (Arg1agent) 
va prendre Pred2 = Pred1 
un petit cercle Arg2agent = SPEC (Arg1agent) 
 
The agent and the predicate are the same for π1 and π2''. 
The patient in π2'' is more specific, since petit cercle 
implies cercle. Therefore, Cpart holds, and we can infer 
Particularisation (π1,π2').  
 
From Particularisation (π1,π2'') follows, that the events 
in  π1 and π2'' are the same and so do the particpants : 
 
π2''   ∃s∃e small(s) ∧ take(e, B, s) ∧ circle(s) ∧ e > now 
   ∧ e = t ∧ s = c   
4.5. Example type E 
 
(8a)  A alors, il va falloir que tu fasses un toit 
   now you have to make a roof 
(8b)  A il faut que tu mettes un grand triangle 
   you have to put a big triangle 
 
For this example, it seems impossible to establish the 
coreference of the indefinites un toit and un grand triangle 
on the basis of linguistic indicators for event coreference. 
We do not have cue phrases, nor semantic relations 
linking the arguments or the predicate. Indeed, even if 
mettre un grand triangle can be seen as specifying the 
action of faire un toit in this particular context of the task, 
establishing this relation needs to take into account 
extralinguistic knowledge. Danlos (1999) proposed 
therefore to extend the notion of hyperonomy between 
lexical items so as to cover extralinguistic hyperonomy 
between clauses. This type of extended hyperonomy is not 
only close to the notion of inference, but it depends also 
on the application specific context.   
One possibility to treat example (8) would be to use an 
inference rule, such as : 
 
R1 : putting a triangle > moving geometrical figures 
 
modelling the fact that putting a triangle is a particular 
form of moving geometrical figures. In addition, we need 
an application specific rule, stating that in this context, 
making pictures (such as a roof) consists in moving 
geometrical figures : 
 
R2 : moving geometrical figures > make a roof  
 
Based on this knowledge, it is possible to infer that 
putting a triangle is a specification of making a roof, and 
therefore, (8a) and (8b) refer to the same event. Since 
event coreference implies the identity of the arguments, a 
roof and a triangle have to refer to the same entity. 
5. Summary and Discussion 
The standard analysis of indefinites sees them as 
context independent and therefore non coreferential. 
However, we presented corpus examples, containing 
sequences of indefinites explicitly referring to the same 
entity. The problem was then to account for such cases in 
an DRT or SDRT-like framework.  
This paper presents an attempt to do this, based on 
recent work on a new discourse relation – 
Particularisation. This relation has one specificity : it 
implies the identity of  the participants involved in the 
related events. It can therefore be considered as one 
possibility to take into account coreferential readings of 
indefinites. 
However, the Particularisation relation has been 
defined for discourse and not for spoken dialogues. 
Adapting it to our dialogue examples demands in 
particular to deal with NP- and VP-ellipses and with a 
variety of speech acts – questions, answers and orders – 
which are different from statements. The first problem can 
be (partially) solved by taking into account the second 
one : Indeed, it has been shown that different speech acts 
impose different constraints their propositional content 
(Grisvard and Gaiffe, 1999). Based on this observation 
and on work about common theme maximazation (Asher 
et al., 1997), is it possible to infer missing information. In 
order to deal with the second problem – the variety of 
speech acts – it is first necessary to combine them into 
more complex discourse segments (for example, a 
question and an anwser into a statement). Secondly, we 
have to admit that Particularisation can hold not only 
between statements, but also between orders, between an 
order and a statement, and between a statement and the 
sum of several statements. 
The mechanism we present here may seem quite 
complicated, if compared to the mechanisms for identity 
postulation for anaphora or identity assertion for to be 
constructions in DRT. Nevertheless, we think that there 
are necessary since a coreferential reading of indefinites 
does not function in exactly the same way as anaphora 
resolution or identity assertion. 
Concerning anaphora resolution in DRT, the principle 
consists in introducing a new discourse referent and to 
choose a suitable antecedent from those which are 
accessible in the discourse universe. The difference with 
the coreferential reading of indefinites is the choice of the 
antecedent : whereas the only choice constraints for 
antecedents of anaphora are pragmatic ones (excepted 
gender, number and semantic restrictions), there is no 
choice at all for coreferential indefinites involved in a 
Particularisation relation : the identity is mandatory for 
the arguments of the same thematical role. 
The main difference with identity assertions such as in 
Fred is a linguist is the following : for coreferential 
indefinites in particularizing discourses, the identity is not 
asserted, but stipulated. Kamp and Reyle (1993 : 258) 
point out that this is not a trivial point, even if the truth-
conditional interpretations for stipulated and asserted 
identity are the same. Stipulated identity (represented by a 
condition x = y) represents the fact that a certain NP is 
being used as a means for picking up a certain discourse 
referent introduced by independent means. Asserted 
identity (represented by a condition x is y) represents the 
fact that the interpreter understands the identity statement 
of x and y, but it does not mean that he or she thinks 
necessarily that this statement is true. If needed, such a 
condition, in which no conflation has taken place, can in 
some way be marked as "dubious", in order to reflect the 
interpreter's epistemic state more accurately. 
Finally, given the unusual mechanisms involved in 
coreferential readings of indefinites, it seems worth to ask 
why speakers use indefinites in such a way. The response 
tho this question lies in the specific interpretation 
principle for indefinites : As opposed to definites, 
demonstratives and pronouns, indefinites do not 
presuppose an external mechanism in order to identify a 
particular individual : they don't designate. The only thing 
they do is to provide information about properties of 
individuals satisfying the description. To put it in other 
words, an indefinite description "a N" presupposes a 
domain of entities of type N, but cannot be used to 
identify a particular individual of this domain. In many 
cases, this domain is context dependent, either given by 
discourse information or by perceptual information, as it is 
the case for our dialogues : here, the interpretation 
domains for the indefinites are provided by the virtual 
stacks of geometrical figures (Figure 1b). To give an 
example, an expression like a triangle presupposes the 
existence of a set of triangles. Such a domain of triangles 
is indeed available, given by the virtual stacks of big and 
small triangles, represented explicitly in (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Interpretation domain for a triangle 
 
The utterance Take a triangle means then that the 
hearer has to choose one of the triangles of this domain. 
Now imagine that the speaker would like to precise the 
size of the triangle which has to be manipulated. Since 
there are always more than one possible referents in the 
perceptual domain, he has to use an indefinite description 
Take a small triangle. A definite description Take the 
small triangle would be inappropriate, simply because the 
structure of the perceptual domain don't allow the hearer 
to identify uniquely a particular triangle. 
What we would like to stress here is the important 
role of the contextual structure for the use of different 
types of referring expressions. Concerning the use of 
coreferential indefinites, we assume the following : Since 
an indefinite description is not used to uniquely identify a 
referent, but to identify a contextual domain, the specific 
role of a sequence of coreferential indefinites is to state a 
relation between two or more domains. In case of   
Particularisation between two utterances, this relation is a 
domain restriction, like in our corpus examples. 
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